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Measuring TRIPS Compliance and Defiance: The WTO Compliance Scorecard
Edward Lee*
An ancient parable, perhaps aptly attributed to different lineages and cultures,
tells the story of several blind people attempting to figure out an elephant, each touching
only a different part of the elephant.1 Each feature of the elephant is accurately
described, but no account adequately captures “the whole of the beast.”2 In many ways,
the WTO stands today like the elephant in the parable. Some commentators extol the
success of the WTO dispute system in securing an “excellent compliance record” in
adjudicated decisions, particularly when compared to the prior GATT system.3 Others,
however, believe the WTO system is deeply flawed or ineffective for any number of
reasons.4 But no matter how many commentators attempt to analyze the WTO, none is
able to capture the whole of the beast. Though numerous scholars have attempted to
assess how successful the WTO has been so far, their answers have been dependent on
the particular feature analyzed and the perspective of each analyzer, much like the
accounts of the blind people in the parable.
This Article continues in the same vein. It assesses one aspect of the WTO: a
country’s efforts to correct a violation of the TRIPS Agreement5 as found by a WTO
decision in the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). As the tale above cautions, this inquiry
provides only a limited view of the functioning of the WTO.
But this analysis is important for at least two reasons. First, at the WTO’s
inception, the elaborate framework established by the Dispute Settlement Understanding
of the WTO was hailed as the “crown jewel” of the entire WTO system.6 Thus, one
cannot determine if the WTO is successful in its mission without some analysis of its
*
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1
See, e.g., THE UDANA & THE ITIVUTTAKA 86-89 (trans. John D. Ireland) (1997) (Buddhist
version); JOHN G. SAXE, THE POETICAL WORKS OF JOHN GODFREY SAXE 111-12 (1892) (Hindu version).
2
See A. J. ARBERRY, TALES FROM THE MASNAVI 208 (1961).
3
See William J. Davey, Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
119, 119 (2009); see also Anu Bradford, When the WTO Works, and How It Fails, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 7-8
(2010); Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 303, 321 (2004).
4
See, e.g.,Brian Manning & Srividhya Ragavan, The Dispute Settlement Process of the WTO: A
Normative Structure to Achieve Utilitarian Objectives, 79 UMKC L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2010); John Ragosta et
al., WTO Dispute Settlement: They System Is Flawed and Must Be Fixed, 37 INT’L LAW. 697, 698 (2003).
5
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
6
See Rachel Brewster, Shadow Unilateralism: Enforcing International Trade Law at the WTO, 30
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1133, 1134 (2009); Deborah E. Siegel, Legal Aspects of the IMF/WTO Relationship: The
Fund’s Articles of Agreement and the WTO Agreements, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 561, 583 (2002).
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dispute settlement system. And that is particularly true for intellectual property laws,
which, unlike trade laws subject to the prior GATT, had no prior international
enforcement mechanism to handle disputes before the creation of the WTO.7 Second,
examining WTO decisions involving TRIPS violations can provide a window on the
WTO’s effectiveness in encouraging or inducing compliance in difficult or contentious
controversies between countries—or, in other words, the hard cases.8 A true test of any
institution is its ability to handle the controversies that are difficult to resolve.9
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I surveys TRIPS disputes brought before
the WTO since its inception (2005 to Jan. 2011), with particular focus on disputes that
culminated in a panel or Appellate Body decision. Part II proposes the WTO’s adoption
of a TRIPS Compliance Scorecard that will keep track of a country’s response to correct
its violation. Two alternative methods are offered—a simple and a complex score. The
Scorecard can offer greater transparency, enable greater cross-country comparisons, and
perhaps serve to induce countries to correct their violations in a reasonable time. Part III
discusses other measures that the WTO can adopt alongside the TRIPS Compliance
Scorecard, including computing scorecards for countries’ compliance in all other WTO
disputes and imposing procedural penalties on countries with low compliance scores.
Part IV addresses objections.
I.

Statistics on the First Fifteen Years of TRIPS

The fifteenth anniversary of the TRIPS Agreement’s effective date marks a good
time for reflection. With the deadlock in the current Doha Round of negotiations, the
WTO, as an institution, seems at a crossroads.10 Yet the current stalemate cannot erase
the accomplishments of the WTO over the past 15 years in handling trade-related
disputes among countries. This Part analyzes the number of IP disputes brought before
the WTO since its inception in 2005 to Jan. 2011, and tracks how these IP disputes were
disposed, whether by settlement11 or WTO decision. The survey shows the following: (i)
few IP challenges—29 of the 419 total WTO challenges (roughly 7%), or 22 disputes if
related matters are paired— have been brought, the majority of which (20 of 29 disputes,
or 15 of 22 matters) were against developed countries; (ii) only a few TRIPS
challenges—8 matters or roughly 36% of the TRIPS matters—were pursued to a WTO
decision, with all but one finding a TRIPS violations; (iii) only 2 TRIPS violations—both
involving the U.S.—have still not been corrected as of Jan. 2011, although the EU, the
7

See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
One reason that TRIPS lends itself to hard cases is that many of its provisions or minimum
standards were left intentionally vague or open-ended, in order to bridge differences among countries in the
North v. South and North v. North (e.g., U.S. v. EU) divides. See CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED
ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 17 (2007).
9
See ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 274 (1993) (“The primary test of a legal system is the extent to which the
system can elicit compliance when a valid legal claim is asserted.”).
10
See Doha Stalemate Unlikely to Resolve This Year: Khullar, FIN. EXPRESS, Sept. 14, 2010,
http://in.news.yahoo.com/doha-stalemate-unlikely-resolve-khullar.html.
11
For simplicity, in this section, I include under “settlement” any dispute that was not pursued to a
formal WTO panel, even if no “mutually agreed settlement” was announced by the countries to the WTO.
8
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complainant in both cases, has not sought retaliation in either case; and (iv) the U.S. and
EU have been the biggest participants in TRIPS disputes, both as complainant and
respondent, with every TRIPS dispute brought so far involving either the U.S. or EU, or
both.12
A.

The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body and Understanding

The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), created by the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU),13 was touted to be a major development for both international IP
and trade. For the first time in history, countries recognized an international institution
that had enforcement power—putatively with teeth—to help ensure countries complied
with their international obligations regarding the minimum standards of IP protection.
All of the prevailing international IP agreements prior to TRIPS—such as the Berne,
Paris, and Rome Conventions—lacked effective enforcement mechanisms to curb
countries’ violations of the treaties.14 In other words, before the WTO, countries could
violate their IP treaty obligations at will—and with impunity.
The DSB was designed to change that—not only for IP laws, but also for
international trade subject to the prior GATT system. The problem with the GATT-1947
dispute settlement system for obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT 1947) was that it was easy for countries to evade. Both the establishment
of a panel and a panel’s ruling required a consensus (sometimes called a “positive
consensus”) from member countries before the GATT Council could adopt the ruling—
which meant that a country found to be in violation could “veto” or block a panel or
ruling simply by voting against it.15 On several occasions, countries “vetoed” adverse
12

See infra Part I.B. Joost Pauwelyn conducted a similar study. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Dog That
Barked But Didn’t Bite: 15 Years of Intellectual Property Disputes at the WTO,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1708026. Because his data set is smaller (up to
DS402), and my groupings of disputes may be different, my figures may be slightly different than his.
13
See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes arts. 16(4) &
17(14), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
14
Although the Berne and Paris Conventions authorize members to bring disputes before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), a member can opt out of the enforcement scheme and “not consider
itself bound” by the ICJ. See BERNE CONV. art. 33(2); PARIS CONV. art. 28(2); see also Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, Some Remarks on the Limits of Harmonization, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 596,
597 (2006) (criticizing ICJ’s apparatus as “toothless”); Gabriel L. Slater, Note, The Suspension of
Intellectual Property Obligations Under TRIPS: A Proposal for Retaliating Against Technology-Exporting
Countries in the World Trade Organization, 97 GEO. L.J. 1365, 1377 & n.58 (2009). No country ever
brought a Berne Convention dispute before the ICJ. See Frederick M. Abbott, The Future of the
Multilateral Trading System in the Context of TRIPS, 20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 661, 664 n.13
(1997). The Rome Convention (for broadcasts, performances, and phonograms) also authorizes disputes to
be heard before the ICJ, but does not allow countries to opt out. See ROME CONV. arts. 30-31. However,
the ICJ has been saddled with a slow process, and its decision ultimately depends on either a country’s
acceptance or enforcement by the United Nation’s Security Council, which is unlikely for matters related to
IP. See Monique L. Cordray, GATT v. WIPO, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 121, 131-32 (1994).
15
See Judith Hippler Bello, International Decisions, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 772, 773-74 (1995); Marian
Ladner & Ogbo Ossai, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization, 20 SPG INT’L L. PRACTICUM
15, 15 (2007).
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decisions, which may have contributed to the overall lack of confidence in and infrequent
use of the GATT dispute system—only 100 panel reports were adopted between 1947
and 1994.16 By contrast, the WTO flips the approach so that WTO panel decisions are
automatically approved unless a consensus (i.e., a “negative consensus”) of countries
votes against adopting the decision.17 Perhaps ironically, the change in procedure
occurred because the U.S. had been resorting to unilateral trade sanctions against
countries under its trade law known as “Section 301” of the Trade Act of 197418 as a way
to counteract the ability of offending countries to veto GATT decisions.19 Other
countries despised the U.S. Section 301 sanctions and made a deal with the U.S.: GATT
decisions would be automatically approved (unless a negative consensus voted against a
decision), and in exchange the U.S. would discontinue its unilateral Section 301 trade
sanctions.20
The DSU has a series of remedial steps for the DSB to take in response to a
violation, leading to the ultimate sanction of retaliation by a country against the offending
country if it fails to comply.21 First, the violating country is afforded a “reasonable
period of time” to implement the WTO recommendations, which typically consist of the
country bringing its laws into compliance.22 As a suggested guideline, the time for
implementation is not to exceed 15 months, although “the time may be shorter or longer,
depending upon the particular circumstances.”23 If the violating country does not fix the
violation within the reasonable time, Article 22 of the DSU allows the complainant
country to request (i) mutually acceptable compensation from the violator, or, if no
agreement is reached between the countries, (ii) the complainant’s suspension of
concessions or other obligations to the violator—what is commonly known as
“retaliation” or trade sanctions.24 But these remedies are “temporary and shall only be
applied until such time as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement

16

Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Lack of Dissent in WTO Dispute Settlement, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 895,
897 & nn. 5-6 (2006).
17
Bello, supra note 15, at 773-74; DSU arts. 16(4); 17(14), supra note 13.
18
See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (year).
19
See Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure An Overview of the First
Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 11 (1999).
20
Id. For the most part, the U.S. has avoided using unilateral trade sanctions since the formation of
the WTO, but it still unilaterally monitors and issues warnings—in the so-called Special 301 reports—
against other countries for their lack of enforcement of IP law or blocking of U.S. goods from their
markets. See Sean Flynn & Joe Karaganis, From TRIP to ACTA: The Rise of the Enforcement Agenda, 18
J. INTELL. PROP. L. (forthcoming 2011).
21
See DSU arts. 21-22, supra note 13. As of Jan. 2011, the WTO has authorized only nine instances
of retaliation, although the complainant may not have exercised that right in every dispute —5 against the
U.S., 2 against the EU, 1 against Brazil, 1 against Canada). See List of WTO Disputes Authorizing Trade
Sanctions 2011 (on file with author). The U.S. disputes were: DS108 (Foreign Sales Corporations);
DS136 (Anti-Dumping Act of 1916); DS217/234 (Byrd Amendment); DS267 (Upland Cotton); and DS285
(Gambling). The EU disputes were: DS26/48 (Hormones); and DS27 (Bananas). The Brazil dispute was
DS46 (Export Financing Programme for Aircraft), while the related Canadian dispute was DS222
(Regional Aircraft).
22
See DSU art. 21(2), supra note 13.
23
Id. art. 21(c)(3).
24
Id. art 22(3); see Davey, supra note 3, at 123 n.33.
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has been removed.”25 During this entire time, the DSB has a duty to “keep surveillance
the implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings” and is supposed to monitor
the situation “until the issue is resolved.”26
As should be evident, the DSU establishes an elaborate process whose main goal
is to secure either settlement or “[p]rompt compliance with recommendations or rulings
of the DSB.”27 One thing to note, however: the remedial aspect of the DSU is forwardlooking, seeking the country’s removal or change of the offending law; it does not require
the violating country to pay compensation or a penalty for the past violation. In this
regard, the DSU is lenient on violations—and different from the approach in some other
areas of international law.28 Sanctions are to be imposed only after a country refuses to
comply with a WTO decision. As a general rule, the DSB seeks prospective compliance
by violating countries.29 The next section examines how well the DSB has achieved that
end.
B.

TRIPS Disputes, 1995 – January 2011

From 1995 to Jan. 2011, WTO countries brought 29 formal complaints involving
the TRIPS Agreement out of the 419 total challenges—or just roughly 7% of all WTO
disputes.30 Some of the complaints involved related controversies, which, if paired
together, would reduce the total number to 22 different TRIPS matters.31 A recent set of
challenges brought by India and Brazil against the EU in 2010 for seizure of generic
drugs in transit was still pending in Jan. 2011, although the dispute brought by India
appears close to a settlement.32
1.

Settled cases

Most of the TRIPS complaints were settled by the countries or were not pursued
to a WTO dispute panel. Excluding the pending EU generic drug dispute, 62% of TRIPS
challenges (13 of 21 completed matters) settled or were not pursued.33

25

DSU art. 22(8), supra note 13.
Id. art. 21(6).
27
Id. art. 21(1).
28
See David J. Townsend, Stretching the Dispute Settlement Understanding: U.S.—Cotton’s
Relaxed Interpretation of Cross-Retaliation in the World Trade Organization, 9 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS.
135, 145-46 (2010).
29
For an interesting proposal to use compensation as a remedy in the DSB, see Marco Bronckers &
Naboth van den Broek, Financial Compensation in the WTO: Improving the Remedies of the WTO Dispute
Settlement, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 101 (2005).
30
See Analysis of TRIPS Disputes 1995-2011, Jan. 31, 2011, (on file with author) [hereinafter
Analysis of TRIPS Disputes].
31
See id.
32
See India-EU Generic Drug Row “Resolved” at Brussels Summit, BBC, Dec. 10, 2010, at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11971568; see also European Union and a Member State –
Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, DS408-DS409 (May 11-12, 2010).
33
See Analysis of TRIPS Disputes, supra note 30.
26
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WTO panel and AB decisions

Out of the 21 resolved TRIPS matters, only 8 went to a WTO panel for decision.34
In all but one dispute (DS59 Indonesia Auto) at least one violation of TRIPS was found.35
However, of the 7 matters in which violations were found, it is worth pointing out that 5
of those decisions also found some aspect of the respondent’s challenged law was
consistent with TRIPS—perhaps rendering the appearance of a Solomonic judgment.36
Only 3 of the 7 (43%) panel decisions in which a TRIPS violation was found were
appealed to the Appellate Body.37 That is lower than the general rate for WTO panel
decisions for which approximately 70% of all panel reports were appealed.38
3.

Disputes by subject matter

In terms of subject matter before the WTO panels, 3 decisions involved patents; 2
involved copyrights; 3 involved trademarks or geographical indications; and 1 also
involved customs disposal of counterfeit and pirated goods, as well as criminal law
requirements under TRIPS.39
4.

Complainants and respondents

In the 22 TRIPS matters, the complainants and respondents were as follows:

34

See id.
See id.
36
See id.
37
See id.
38
See Kara Leitner & Simon Lester, WTO Settlement 1995-2009—A Statistical Analysis, 13 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 205, 212 (2010).
39
See id. Some of the disputes also involve challenges brought under GATT or other trade
agreements, but they are included as long as one challenge in the disputes involves TRIPS. See, e.g., Panel
Decision, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R (July 2, 1998)
(DSB adopted July 23, 1998). Conversely, some non-TRIPS involve IP-related issues, but those disputes
were not included here. See infra note 121.
35
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TRIPS Disputes, 2005 to Jan. 2011
Table 1
Complainants
Respondents
(some matters have multiple complainants)

Member
United States
EU
Brazil
Australia
Canada
India

(some matters have multiple respondents)

Disputes
17
7
2
1
1
1

Member
EU
United States
Canada
China
Argentina
Brazil
Denmark
Greece
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Japan
Pakistan
Portugal
Sweden

Disputes
5
4
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

The breakdown of complainants and respondents is interesting on several fronts.
First, the U.S. is the biggest complainant, filing a challenge in 77% (17 of 22) of the
TRIPS matters.40 The EU is the second biggest complainant, filing challenges in 32% (7
of 22) of the TRIPS matters.41 Only two developing countries (Brazil and India) have
raised TRIPS challenges so far, which were against the U.S. and the EU.42 The large
number of complaints by the U.S. and EU is also reflected in WTO challenges generally.
According to Leitner and Lester’s 2009 study, the U.S. brought the most WTO challenges
(93, representing 22% of challenges) in the WTO, while the EU, the second most (81,
representing 19%).43
Second, the EU has the most TRIPS challenges (at 5) against it, with the U.S.
with the second most at 4 challenges.44 A similar breakdown exists for all WTO
disputes; according to Leitner and Lester’s survey, the U.S. has received the most
challenges at 108 (27%), with the EU second at 67 (17%).45 The majority of TRIPS
complaints have been against developed countries. 15 of the 22 TRIPS disputes (68%)
were against developed countries, while 7 (32%) were against developing countries.46 Of
40

See Analysis of TRIPS Disputes, supra note 30.
Id. The percentage with the U.S. percentage is greater than 100 because several countries can
bring challenges in the same WTO matter.
42
Id.
43
See Leitner & Lester, supra note 38, at 207 (table 1).
44
See Analysis of TRIPS Disputes, supra note 30.
45
See Leitner & Lester, supra note 38, at 207 (table 2).
46
See Analysis of TRIPS Disputes, supra note 30.
41
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the 15 matters against developed countries, all but two were brought by developed
countries.47 Conversely, all of the 7 disputes against developing countries were brought
by developed countries.48 Thus, in the majority of TRIPS challenges, the disputes
involved the North versus the North, although the North did go after the South in 7
disputes.
Third, the TRIPS challenges before the WTO are a “U.S.-EU show.”
Remarkably, every single TRIPS challenge in the first 15 years of the WTO had either the
U.S. or the EU, or both, involved in the dispute either as a complainant or respondent.49
The heavy U.S. and EU involvement in TRIPS disputes is consistent with their
dominance in WTO disputes generally. From 1995 to 2009, 43.3% of the total disputes
involved either the U.S. or EU as complainant, while 43.8% of the total complaints
involved either the U.S. or EU as respondents.50 50 disputes pitted the U.S. and EU
against each other, 5 of which involved TRIPS disputes.51 More recent trends from 2005
to 2009 indicate, however, that the U.S. and EU have decreased their number of WTO
challenges, while developing countries have increased their challenges.52 Also, China
has become a more frequent participant in WTO disputes mainly as a respondent, but also
as a complainant.53 Despite the recent trends, the TRIPS disputes have been dominated
by the U.S. and EU throughout the entire period.
5.

Time to correct violations

Finally, in terms of TRIPS compliance, all of the offending countries in the 7
disputes with a TRIPS violation—with the notable exception of the U.S. in 2 of the
disputes—enacted changes to their laws to bring them into compliance.54 The U.S. has
not corrected its violations in the Section 110(5) and Havana Club Rum disputes.55 The
average time it took the offending countries other than the U.S. to correct their violations
was less than a year (10.4 months) from the DSB’s adoption of the WTO decision. The
breakdown by member and dispute is shown in the following Table:

47

Id.
Id.
49
Id.
50
See Leitner & Lester, supra note 38, at 208.
51
Id. (50 disputes); Analysis of TRIPS Disputes, supra note 30 (5 TRIPS disputes).
52
See Leitner & Lester, supra note 38, at 208-09.
53
Id. at 216-17.
54
See Analysis of TRIPS Disputes, supra note 30.
55
See United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, DS160, Current Status,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds160_e.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011); Dispute
Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, Sept. 21, 2010, ¶¶ 21-25 [hereinafter Sept. 2010 Minutes]
(discussing unfixed status of Section 110(5)); United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of
1998, DS176, Current Status, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds176_e.htm (last
visited Feb. 7, 2011); Sept. 2010 Minutes, supra, at ¶¶ 2-16 (discussing unfixed status of Section 211).
48
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Time Taken by Member to Comply with WTO Decision
Table 2
Member and Dispute
Time to Comply
India – Pharmaceutical Patents (“mailbox rule”)
15 months fixed
Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents
4 months fixed
Canada – Patent Term
9 months fixed
EU – Trademark and GIs
1 year fixed
China – IP Rights
1 year fixed
U.S. – Section 110(5)
10 years + counting*
US. – Havana Club Rum
9 years + counting*
Thus, with the exception of the U.S., members have corrected their TRIPS violations
within a short amount of time. Although the sample is small, 71% of the TRIPS
violations have been fully (and timely) corrected—a number that is similar to Hudec’s
analysis of full correction in 68% of GATT disputes from 1948 to 1990.56 Davey
estimates that, in the first ten years of the WTO, successful implementation occurred in
83% of the disputes.57
II.

Developing the TRIPS Scorecard for Compliance and Defiance

The idea of a using a scorecard or rating system is, of course, not new to the law
or regulators—just think of the air quality index, credit ratings, Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), and the Human Development Index.58 Scholars, too, have proposed scorecard or
index systems to enhance our understanding of various things, ranging from
competitiveness in countries and intellectual property enforcement, to the quality of life
in countries and even judicial rankings.59 Even within the WTO, the EU has proposed
that the WTO Secretariat use a “scorecard” to ensure transparency in country compliance
56

See HUDEC, supra note 9, at 278-79.
See William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 17, 47 (2005). The figures noted above from Hudec and Davey do not measure timeliness, however.
Davey’s estimate based on four years of WTO decisions suggests that the overall average time for
implementation is over 15 months. See id. at 49.
58
See U.S. Air Quality Status and Trends Through 2008, 20 No. 4 AIRPOLC 1.4 (2010) (discussing
air quality index); Understanding Standard & Poor’s Rating Definitions, 917 PLI/COMM. 53, 58 (2009)
(credit ratings); Rosa Giovanna Barresi, The Impact of Monetary Union and the Euro on European Capital
Markets: What May Be Achieved in Capital Market Integration, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1257, 1258 n.2
(2005) (gross domestic product); Rajesh Swaminathan, Regulating Development: Structural Adjustment
and the Case for National Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 161,
179-80 (1998) (Human Development Index).
59
See IMD World Competitiveness Scoreboard,
http://www.imd.org/research/publications/wcy/upload/scoreboard.pdf (rating economic competitiveness in
countries); Robert M. Sherwood, Intellectual Property Systems and Investment Stimulation: The Rating of
Systems in Eighteen Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 261, 261 (1997) (“The rating system examines regime
effectiveness from the perspective of private investment stimulation, particularly national private
investment.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Well-Being and the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1304 (1994) (quality
of life index for countries); Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Ranking Judges According to Citation Bias (as
a Means to Reduce Bias), 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1279 (2007) (judicial rankings in terms of bias).
57
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with any rule eventually adopted governing fisheries subsidies.60 As the EU proposal
suggests, a scorecard can provide greater transparency and attention to compliance with
treaty obligations, and it enables greater cross-country comparisons on the same index.
This Part proposes that the WTO utilize a TRIPS Scorecard to monitor countries’
correction of any TRIPS violations found by the DSB.
A.

Theories of Compliance and Defiance

Before turning to the TRIPS Scorecard, it would be fruitful to put the discussion
of a compliance scorecard against the backdrop of the larger, normative debate over
(non)compliance with international law. Although it goes beyond the scope of this
Article to resolve this longstanding, if not never-ending, debate, the theories are useful to
frame the later discussion of the Compliance Scorecard.
1.

Noncompliance as inevitable or even acceptable

A number of leading theorists characterize the failure of member countries to
correct their own violations of a treaty as inevitable in an international system with
political actors. The late Robert Hudec was a leading advocate of this political realist
view. Hudec believed that international trade law was not immune from politics.61 The
GATT dispute system would fail in so-called “wrong cases,” Hudec wrote, in which the
political will of the countries to comply was lacking or diminished.62 One type of wrong
case involves a country’s “ordinary noncompliance” with a treaty due to political
expediency or special interest pressure in the country.63 No matter how elaborate the
dispute settlement procedures, Hudec doubted their ability to discipline countries
effectively because compliance depended on the political will of countries to comply, in
Hudec’s view.64
In a prescient passage worth quoting at length, Hudec cautioned:
A third lesson suggested by the GATT’s experience is that political will is really more
important than rigorously binding procedures—that strong procedures by themselves are
not likely to make a legal system very effective if they do not have sufficient political
will behind them….The current fascination with the novel WTO procedures tends to
obscure the importance of this first and most important condition of success.
What can be said today about the political will behind the new WTO system? Based on
first impressions, the answer should begin on a note of skepticism. Today’s WTO
governments are the same governments, more or less, as the ones that stood behind the
old GATT disputes system. While those governments did achieve a level of compliance
that was exceptional by international standards, their commitment was not strong enough
60

See Derek Dostal, Global Fisheries Subsidies: Will the WTO Reel in Effective Regulations, 26 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 815, 831 (2005).
61
See Robert E. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business,
13 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 145, 159 (1980).
62
Id. at 159.
63
Id.
64
See Hudec, supra note 19, at 11.
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to deter occasional outbreaks of noncompliant behavior, particularly among its leading
citizens. The new WTO system asks for a stronger political commitment because it sets
the bar higher. Yet it is difficult to identify any major changes in national political life in
the major WTO countries that will make their political systems more receptive to WTO
legal discipline than they were in the decade or two before the WTO came into being.65

As discussed in the next Parts, Hudec’s prediction about noncompliance in the
WTO turned out to be uncanny. Although Hudec was not sanguine about the WTO’s
ability to prevent ordinary noncompliance by countries, he was no advocate for
acceptance of noncompliance. Instead, Hudec advised the WTO “to treat the failed legal
ruling with persistence, patience and practicality—the persistence of keeping the matter
on its agenda, the patience of doing so for what may be a long period of time, and the
practicality of fashioning eventual accommodations that produce a result that can be said
to be consistent with long-term respect for GATT/WTO law.”66
Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner adopt a view of international law that treats
noncompliance as simply a byproduct of a country’s self-interest. In their rational choice
theory, countries agree to international treaties out of their own self-interest; thus,
compliance ultimately depends on a country’s own self-interest in complying or not.67
Goldsmith and Posner’s approach puts a more positive—or at least political realist—
gloss on a country’s violation of a treaty. While Hudec’s approach highlights the lack of
political will of a country, Goldsmith and Posner’s approach focuses on the rational and
self-interest reasons for a country to choose to violate its treaty obligations. Goldsmith
and Posner do acknowledge, however, that more powerful countries like the U.S. have
greater “freedom of action” to violate treaties than weaker countries in the GATT/WTO
system.68 A similar view of rational noncompliance is taken by Judith Bello specifically
regarding the WTO.69
2.

Noncompliance as a negative violation to be corrected

Another school of thought views a country’s violation of its treaty obligations as a
negative that a country should correct because treaties are legal obligations. Abram
Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes argued that “[t]he norms established by treaties are
legal norms, at least in that they embody rules acknowledged in principle to be legally
binding on states that ratify them.”70 Moreover, “[t]he rule that ‘every treaty in force is
binding on the parties to it and must be performed in good faith,’ codified in Article 26 of
65

Id. at 11-12 (ellipsis and emphasis added).
Id. at 15.
67
JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2005).
68
Id. at 162.
69
See Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less Is More, 90 AM. J.
INT’L L. 416, 417 (1996) (“If the local politics du jour or changing economics require or merit it, any WTO
member may exercise its sovereignty and take action inconsistent with the WTO Agreement, provided only
that it compensates adversely affected trading partners or suffers offsetting retaliation.”). But see Sungjoon
Cho, The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 763, 780-83 (2004)
(criticizing Bello’s argument); John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement UnderstandingMisunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligations, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 60 (1997).
70
See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 116 (1995).
66
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the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, has long been recognized as a
fundamental background norm of international law.”71 In short, international law
functions as a rule of law.
Legal scholars who believe in the binding nature of international treaties often
take different views on how best to achieve treaty compliance. For example, the Chayes
believed that treaty noncompliance stems principally from a country’s “lack of capability
or clarity or priority,” and not from a country’s “willful disobedience.”72 They advised,
therefore, not coercive sanctions for treaty enforcement, but rather, building member
compliance through “management” instruments of transparency, dispute settlement,
capacity building, and uses of persuasion.73 By contrast, Harold Koh argued that the key
to compliance is a country’s “repeated participation in the transnational legal process” by
which a country will face “frictions” in reaction to its noncompliance; over time, the
country is likely to move “from one-time grudging compliance with an external norm to
habitual internalized obedience.”74 Thomas Franck, by contrast, contended that treaty
compliance is best secured when countries view the international rules to be fair.75
The WTO adopts the view that treaty violations are negative occurrences that
should be corrected. The DSU states: “Prompt compliance with recommendations or
rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the
benefit of all Members.”76 The DSU considers that “[i]n the absence of a mutually agreed
solution [between the countries], the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism”
is the “secur[ing of] the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be
inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements.”77 As John Jackson
explained, the DSU “clearly establishes a preference for an obligation to perform the
recommendation.”78
With that in mind, this Article begins with the premise that the WTO, as an
institution, seeks countries’ compliance with their WTO treaty obligations once a
violation has been found in the DSB. Although the proposed Scorecard does not mandate
that countries adopt a certain view in this normative debate, from the WTO’s perspective,
the Scorecard shares the second view above that WTO violations are to be corrected.
The viewpoint adopted herein is not meant to favor a particular country or group of
countries, but instead, to serve the WTO as an institution. The next section considers a
better way for the WTO to keep track of compliance.

71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Id.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 22-28.
Harold Hongju Ko, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2655 (1997).
See THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995).
DSU art. 21(1), supra note 13.
Id. art. 3(7) (emphasis added).
See Jackson, supra note 69, at 63 (emphasis in original).
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The TRIPS Compliance Scorecard

The WTO website, administered by the WTO Secretariat, tracks every dispute
ever brought before the WTO, including, in the event of a violation, a country’s efforts to
correct a law found by a WTO decision to be in violation of a treaty obligation. But the
WTO website does so in a way that is not all that helpful.79 To be sure, a lot of
information is presented on the WTO website, but in ways that are not always easy to
digest or understand. It offers too much information and minutiae, without sufficient
summaries or an overall view. The information on the WTO website is dispersed across
the individual web pages for each dispute—meaning one cannot know the dispositions of
all WTO disputes, including countries’ correction (or not) of violations, without clicking
on all the different links for the individual cases. In some instances, the information does
not appear to be current.80 In short, the website is not user-friendly or helpful for
someone trying to get an overall picture of the DSB.
This Article proposes a better way: the tabulation of a TRIPS Compliance
Scorecard measuring a country’s attempt to correct any treaty violation that a WTO panel
or the Appellate Body has found. On a single webpage, the WTO would list the TRIPS
Compliance Scorecards for all countries ever to have been found to be in violation of
TRIPS. (Countries that had no such violations would not be listed.) Through this
webpage, the WTO and its members may make cross-country comparisons and a more
informed assessment of the effectiveness of the DSB. A compliance scorecard arguably
falls within the power of the WTO Secretariat, which has the responsibility of providing
“secretarial and technical support” to WTO panels—a power that authorizes, for
example, the Secretariat’s creation and maintenance of the WTO’s current website for
dispute cases.81 A simple version of a scorecard would be merely a cosmetic change to
the current website—like rearranging furniture on the deck. To the extent a more
complex scorecard would require further DSB consideration, the DSU arguably
recognizes the power to use a scorecard under the broad “surveillance” power granted to
79

The WTO keeps track of such information on the specific webpage for each dispute resolved by a
panel decision under the heading of “Implementation Status of Adopted Reports.” See, e.g., United States
– Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, DS160, Current Status,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds160_e.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011);. Although
the WTO website allows searching by “current status” of disputes, the search result only lists dispute
numbers of the cases; a person needs to click on each link in order to find description of the case and its
status. See Current Status of Disputes, at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_current_status_e.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011). Also,
the WTO website posts minutes from DSB meetings in which the status of some disputes and failures to
correct violations is reported. See, e.g., Surveillance of Implementation of DSB Rulings, June 22, 2010, at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/dsb_22jun10_e.htm. Finally, each year the WTO publishes
an Annual Report that discusses the status of open cases in the DSB. See, e.g., WTO ANNUAL REPORT
2010, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/anrep10_e.htm. None of these materials provides
an easy-to-view summary of all uncorrected violations or how long they have remained so.
80
See, e.g., Canada – Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft, DS222, Current
Status, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds222_e.htm (2003 report is last information
on resolution of dispute without final resolution) (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
81
See id. art. 27(1); Dispute Settlement: The Disputes,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_dispu_cases_e.htm#results (“This summary has been
prepared by the Secretariat under its own responsibility.”) (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
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the DSB.82 My proposal is for the WTO to supplement the information currently on its
website with a TRIPS Scorecard.
1.

Why a Scorecard?

Scholars and policymakers have increasingly analyzed the effectiveness of the
WTO as an institution by examining members’ compliance with WTO their obligations,
especially through the dispute settlement process.83 To be sure, focusing on just dispute
settlement cases is deficient because it ignores compliance that routinely occurs outside
the dispute settlement process, such as in countries’ enactment and enforcement of
intellectual property laws. Nonetheless, some benefit may be gained by looking at how
well countries have complied with their obligations in more controversial areas that have
led to WTO disputes. After all, the so-called “crown jewel” of the WTO would be fool’s
gold if the DSB itself lacked effective enforcement.
Good governance in the WTO requires transparency and access to information
related to WTO matters.84 Such transparency is important to earn the respect and trust of
countries, individuals, NGOs, and other non-state actors that are affected by WTO
decisions.85 Indeed, the WTO already shares this goal. As the Appellate Body has
stated, Article X of GATT 1994 “embod[ies] a principle of fundamental importance—
that of promoting full disclosure of governmental acts affecting Members and private
persons and enterprises, whether of domestic or foreign nationality.”86 As the AB
explained:
The relevant policy principle is widely known as the principle of transparency and
has obviously due process dimensions. The essential implication is that Members
82

Article 21(6) instructs that the “DSB shall keep under surveillance the implementation of adopted
recommendations or rulings.” DSU art. 21(6), supra note 13. A scorecard would be a form of surveillance
on such implementation. For further discussion of the authority of the WTO to implement a scorecard, see
infra Part IV.A.2.
83
See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences, 38 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 405 (2003); Davey, supra note 3, at 119; Yuka Fukunaga, Securing Compliance Through the
WTO Dispute Settlement System: Implementation of DSB Recommendations, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 383
(2006); Hudec, supra note 19, at 11, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1999); Sebastiaan Princen, EC
Compliance with WTO Law: the Interplay of Law and Politics, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 555 (2004); Paul
Rothstein, Note, Moving All-In with the World Trade Organization: Ignoring Adverse Rulings and
Gambling with the Future of the WTO, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 151 (2008); C. O’Neal Taylor,
Impossible Cases: Lessons from the First Decade of WTO Dispute Settlement, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L.
309 (2007); Carlos M. Vazquez & John H. Jackson, Some Reflections on Compliance with WTO Dispute
Settlement Decisions, 33 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 555 (2002). The predecessor GATT system also
elicited much study. See, e.g., William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 51
(1987); Robert E. Hudec et al., A Statistical Profile of GATT Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948-1989, 2
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1993).
84
See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Transparency and Participation in the World Trade Organization, 56
RUTGERS L. REV. 927, 928 (2004);
85
See Seema Sapra, The WTO System of Trade Governance: The Stale NGO Debate and the
Appropriate Role for Non-State Actors, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L. 71, 101 (2009).
86
See Appellate Body Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made
Fibre Underwear, WT/DS24/AB/R, at 20 (AB adopted Feb. 25, 1997) (discussing Art. X of GATT 1947).
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and other persons affected, or likely to be affected, by governmental measures
imposing restraints, requirements, and other burdens, should have a reasonable
opportunity to acquire authentic information about such measures and
accordingly to protect and adjust their activities or alternatively to seek
modification of such measures ...87
Although Article X deals with transparency in member nations, the same principle should
apply generally to the WTO as an institution. Indeed, the WTO would lose legitimacy if
it required countries to follow good governance principles that the WTO itself flouted.
Accordingly, the current website of the WTO publicly disseminates an incredible amount
of information about WTO decisions, consistent with this overriding goal of
transparency.
More generally, scholars and regulators such as Cass Sunstein, now Administrator
of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, have recognized the
importance that administrative bodies disseminate information in formats people can
easily understand and use.88 If we apply this principle to the WTO, we find a chief defect
in the WTO’s website: it provides too much information in piecemeal fashion without
any accompanying overall summary. The WTO website is like being stuck in a million
trees, without any view of the forest.
The proposed Scorecard would help to fix the WTO website by making it more
user-friendly. The Scorecard distills information from the WTO website and winnows it
down to a single table listing scores of country compliance with DSB rulings. This
Article proposes two options for the TRIPS Scorecard: (1) a simple formula and (2) a
complex formula. The WTO would select only one type of Scorecard to use, although
the underlying data used in the simple formula might also be listed along with the
Complex Scorecard.89
2.

Simple TRIPS Compliance Scorecard

One option for the WTO would be to adopt a Simple TRIPS Compliance
Scorecard. It would track two variables: (1) the total number of a country’s laws in
violation of TRIPS by the DSB, and (2) the time a country takes to correct the violation.
Zero (0) is a perfect score for each country, representing no violations. For each
violation uncorrected, a negative number would be assigned. Thus, under this simple
87

Id. (emphasis added). For further discussion, see Padideh Ala’I, From the Periphery to the
Center? The Evolving WTO Jurisprudence on Transparency and Good Governance, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L.
779 (2008).
88
See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 204 (2008) (“In both the public and private sectors, a primary goal should be to
increase transparency.”); The Power Brokers: Cass Sunstein, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Jan. 8, 2011, http://images.businessweek.com/slideshows/20110119/the-power-brokers/slides/2 (“Ideas he
championed as a behavioral economics advocate on the importance of disclosing information in readily
understandable form are surfacing in the regulatory world.”).
89
One thing to avoid is using two “Scorecards,” in order to avoid confusion, especially given that
the perfect scores are dramatically different between the two types of Scorecards (0 and 100).
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approach, if Country A has 3 laws in violation of TRIPS, its score would be -3. Once a
country corrects a violation, the number would decrease by one for each violating law
corrected. For example, if Country A corrected 2 of its laws, the score would improve to
-1. The scores can be tabulated after the reasonable time for implementation expired for
a violating country, which would typically allow at least a one-year grace period.
The Simple TRIPS Scorecard breaks down as follows:
TRIPS Compliance Scorecard (Simple) (Jan. 2011)
Member
Live violations
United States
-2
Canada
0
China
0
EU
0
India
0
The Simple TRIPS Scorecard can be broadened to include some measure of the
time a country in violation has taken before correcting the violation(s), as depicted below:
TRIPS Compliance Scorecard (Simple) (Jan. 2011)
Member
Live violations
Years to comply
United States
-2
9 + 10 years + counting*
India
0
(15 months, 1 fixed)
Canada
0
(9 mos. + 6 mos., 2 fixed )
China
0
(1 year, 1 fixed)
EU
0
(1 year, 1 fixed)
The Simple TRIPS Scorecard shows that most of the violations were fixed within a short
amount of time. The U.S. still has not corrected its 2 violations after 9 and 10 years
counting, however.90
The two variables in the Simple Scorecard track two important values recognized
by the DSU. First, consistent with Article 3’s recognition of the “first objective” of
correcting the violation (absent a mutual agreement),91 the Scorecard keeps track of live
violations until they are corrected. Second, consistent with Article 21’s goal of
compliance within a “reasonable period of time,”92 the Scorecard monitors the time
countries take to comply with WTO decisions.93
90

See supra note 55.
DSU art. 3(7), supra note 13.
92
Id. art. 21(3)(c).
93
The Simple Scorecard might also list other variables, such as: (1) total number of challenges a
country faced, (2) number of mutually agreed solutions, timely corrections of violations, and disputes in
which the country was found to have no violation at all (what I call “Good Behavior Credit” in the next
section); and (3) number of trade sanctions authorized (if any) against a country. The danger of listing
more variables, however, is that the scorecard may become too complicated—defeating the purpose of the
scorecard in the first place.
91
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Of course, some judgment would have to be made as to what constitutes a
“violation.” My view is that the Scorecard should count the number of laws in violation,
not the number of treaty provisions violated. This avoids the potential problem of
“double counting” a law that may violate several provisions, such as national treatment
and most favored nation,94 which may be common given their overlap. Consistent with
the DSU’s focus, the Scorecard tracks the number of laws that need to be corrected. But
does a law with two or more violating provisions constitute one violation or several? For
simplicity, my preference would be for the WTO to treat all related provisions or laws as
constituting one violation as long as they all related to a common violation of a treaty
provision. Also, my proposal is guided by a principle of leniency and is designed to offer
some leniency to noncompliant countries in the calculation of their Scorecards.95 Thus,
in close cases, the principle of leniency would counsel the WTO to adopt the lower
number of violations for the Scorecard.
The Simple Scorecard might assign different points to violations depending on if
they were major or minor—e.g., 2 for major violations, 1 for standard violations, and .5
for mere technical or minor violations. For example, a violation of national treatment
(discriminating against foreign nationals96) could be treated as a more serious violation
than a violation of the “mailbox rule” for preserving priority of patent applications during
a developing country’s transitional period. However, I believe this approach is
misguided. Especially for the Simple Scorecard, the goal should be to minimize the need
for making subjective judgments in tallying up the scorecard. A bean counter should be
able to perform the task.
3.

Complex TRIPS Compliance Scorecard

The Simple Scorecard is easy to formulate by simply listing raw numbers for live
violations and years taken to comply. An alternative approach would be to include both
variables into a single number along a scale measuring overall compliance with WTO
decisions involving TRIPS. This approach is what I call the Complex TRIPS
Compliance Scorecard.

94

See TRIPS Agreement arts. 3-4, supra note 5.
This principle of leniency is not expressly discussed in the DSU, although the series of steps
delineated in the DSU to achieve a “positive solution”—with the “last resort” of trade sanctions—do
embody a lenient approach. See DSU art. 3(7), supra note 13. Moreover, customary international law
recognizes the interpretive principle of dubio mitius under which an ambiguous treaty provision is to be
interpreted as creating a less onerous burden on the party in question. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez,
Judicial Review in the United State and in the WTO: Some Similarities and Differences, 36 GEO. WASH.
INT’L L. REV. 587, 604-05 (2004). Likewise, the rule of lenity favors a similar approach in the context of
international criminal law. See Alison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93
CAL. L. REV. 75, 84-85 (2005). The WTO’s Anti-Dumping Agreement follows a similar approach in
Article 17.6. See Vazquez, supra, at 604-05.
96
See Thomas Cottier & Markus Krajewsi, What Role for Non-Discrimination and Prudential
Standards in International Financial Law, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 817, 820-21 (2010).
95
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The Complex Scorecard can provide a clearer indicator of a country’s overall
performance or compliance in the DSB by reducing it into a single number, much in the
same way as GDP indicates national economic growth,97 or GPA or grade point average
informs students of their overall performance in school. If the overall score is easy to
understand (getting a 4.0 in school is excellent, e.g.), then the score is better as an overall
indicator of performance than would be looking at just the individual raw scores.
Another advantage with this approach is that the WTO can weigh the variables and
include other variables in the computation of the complex score in a way that signaled the
WTO’s view of the importance of a variable. For example, as proposed below, the
formula can be devised to weigh more negatively a country with multiple uncorrected
violations versus a single uncorrected violation—the basic premise being that a first
offense is not as bad as multiple offenses.98 On the other hand, the Complex Scorecard
has tradeoffs. Adding and weighting more variables in the Scorecard may bring greater
complexity and controversy. Too much complexity or controversy would defeat the
whole purpose of transparency in the Scorecard.
a.

The basic formula

With that caveat in mind, I offer a basic formula for the proposed Complex
TRIPS Scorecard, followed by optional variables that may be added if so preferred. The
basic formula is as follows:
Complex Compliance Score = 100 – x (y1 + y2 + y3 + …)
100 represents the perfect score of compliance following an adverse WTO decision
against a country. X represents the number of laws in a country still in violation. For
each law in violation, Y represents the number of years after a final WTO decision in
which the law has not been corrected. Only uncorrected violations are included in the
calculation. As with the Simple Scorecard, only countries that had received adverse
decisions from the DSB would be listed on the Complex Scorecard.
Under the above formula, a country loses its perfect score of compliance (100) as
soon as it has an uncorrected violation that has lasted a year or longer after the WTO
decision. Before a year has elapsed, however, the country would still have a perfect score
of 100. Thus, the country effectively has a one-year grace period from the date the DSB
97

See Sunstein, supra note 59, at 1304-08.
It goes beyond this Article’s scope to provide a full discussion of this principle. The principle has
applications in both national and international law. For example, in criminal law, treating more severely
multiple and repeat offenses is a common principle in many Western countries, including the United States.
See Julian V. Roberts, The Role of Criminal Records in the Sentencing Process, 22 CRIME & JUST. 303
(1997). The principle also is common in copyright infringement policies and laws, sometimes called the
“graduated response” or “3 strikes law” that require termination of Internet accounts for “repeat infringers.”
See David W. Quist, Three Strikes and You’re Out: A Survey of Foreign Approaches to Preventing
Copyright Infringement on the Internet, 66 BUS. LAW. 261 (2010); Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response,
62 FLA. L. REV. 1373 (2010). The U.S. DMCA safe harbor follows this approach. See 17 U.S.C. §
512(i)(1)(A) (requiring implementation of repeat infringer policy). In international law, the principle of
“cessation and non-repetition” of wrongful acts is meant to deter repeat violations by a country. See Cho,
supra note 69, at 771-72 & n.39.
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adopts the decision in which to comply with the WTO recommendations before the
country loses its perfect compliance score of 100. The formula can be altered to give a
greater grace period, such as 2 or 3 years, in order to accommodate perceived difficulties
or political realities of enacting legislation. However, I have chosen to use 1 year as the
default grace period because it is a common “reasonable period of time” used in WTO
disputes,99 and because countries with TRIPS violations have, for the most part, corrected
their violations within a year.100
To get an idea of how the Complex Scorecard works, imagine that Country A had
1 violation that had not been corrected for 1 year. Country A would receive a score of
99. Each year thereafter, the score decreases by 1 as depicted for the first ten years of
noncompliance on the diagram below.
Sample Compliance Scorecard for Member with 1 Violation
Live violations
Years in violation
Score
1
1
99
1
2
98
1
3
97
1
4
96
1
5
95
1
6
94
1
7
93
1
8
92
1
9
91
1
10
90
Consistent with a principle of leniency, the scoring system is lenient on what might be
likened to “first-time offenders” or the “first offense.” A country with only 1 uncorrected
violation may still maintain a high compliance score, even after many years of failing to
correct the single violation. Each year of noncompliance decreases the overall score only
by a factor of 1. A country could maintain a positive score even with 100 years of
noncompliance.
However, the Scorecard treats more severely countries that have multiple laws in
violation of treaty obligations. Under the formula, the number of violations is multiplied
by the sum of the number of years a country has failed to correct each violation. The
“multiplier effect” here produces a lower compliance score for a country that has multiple
violations uncorrected versus a country that has only a single violation. For example, if
Country B had 2 violations that were uncorrected for just 2 years, Country B receives a

99

See, e.g., China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights, DS362, Current Status, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds362_e.htm (12
months) (last visited Feb. 7, 2011); United States – Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act, DS160, Current
Status, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds160_e.htm (12 months) (last visited Feb. 7,
2011).
100
See supra Part I.B.5.
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compliance score of 92. By contrast, because Country A had only 1 violation, it would
receive a score of 92 only after 8 years of noncompliance.
Sample Scorecard for Member with 2 Violations
Live violations
Years in violation
Score
2
1
96
2
2
92
2
3
88
2
4
84
2
5
80
2
6
76
2
7
72
2
8
68
2
9
64
2
10
60
After year 10 of noncompliance, Country B receives a compliance score of 60 for its 2
violations—which is much worse than Country A’s score of 90 after year 10 for only 1
violation. The reason for the disparity is the multiplier effect: For two violations
uncorrected for the same length, each year of noncompliance decreases the overall score
by a factor of four. For three violations, by a factor of nine. For four violations, by a
factor of sixteen, etc. The basic idea behind the multiplier effect is that the leniency
afforded to a country with outstanding violations under the Scorecard should decrease, by
a larger degree, with each additional violation committed.
Using this formula, the compliance scores in January 2011 for countries with past
TRIPS violations in the DSB are:
TRIPS Compliance Scorecard (Complex) (Jan. 2011)
Member
Compliance Score
Canada
100
China
100
EU
100
India
100
United States
62
The U.S. score was determined as follows: 100 – 2 violations (10 years + 9 years) = 62.
Bear in mind: the U.S. can dramatically improve its score simply by correcting one of the
violations. For example, should the U.S. correct its longest standing violation in the
Section 110(5) case, the U.S. compliance score would jump nearly 30 points to 91, even
though the U.S. still had one TRIPS violation outstanding.
b.

The trade sanction multiplier

The basic formula of the TRIPS Compliance Scorecard can include other
variables. One option would be to include a multiplier to the computation of years of
20
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delay in those disputes in which the respondent country obtains WTO authorization of the
ultimate penalty of trade sanctions against a violating country.101 Thus, below, S
represents the multiplier for trade sanctions:
Compliance Score with Trade Sanctions = 100 – x (y1S + y2 + y3 + …)
For each dispute involving trade sanctions, the years uncorrected (Y) is multiplied by the
trade sanction multiplier (S).
For example, the trade sanction multiplier might be 3, a number used sometimes
in national disputes for the trebling of awards or penalties for more severe offenses. If
Country C was subject to trade sanctions in the WTO for 1 violation that had gone
uncorrected for 10 years, Country C would receive a compliance score of 70. After year
11, the compliance score would drop to 67. And, if Country C had another violation that
was not corrected for over 1 year (but without trade sanctions), Country C’s score would
worsen even more. For example, if Country C had 1 violation uncorrected for over 13
years that was subject to trade sanctions, and a second violation uncorrected for 1 year
but without trade sanctions, Country C’s compliance score would drop to 20.102
The theory behind the trade sanction multiplier is that the DSB’s authorization of
the ultimate penalty of a trade sanction against a violating country should factor
negatively in the country’s Compliance Scorecard. Like the authorization of trade
sanctions, the multiplier signals that the complainant country is dissatisfied with the
violator’s continued noncompliance, and that the violator has not complied with the
DSB’s recommendations within a reasonable time. However, some may view the trade
sanction multiplier as inappropriate because it ignores the positive benefits that may be
obtained from trade sanctions. As Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan has argued, because the
authorization of trade sanctions is tied to a level “equivalent to the level of nullification
or impairment” suffered by the complainant country,103 trade sanctions can be seen as
positive “re-balancing [of] the level of bilateral WTO commitments between the two
countries.”104 This rebalancing may be seen as a positive remedy or process in its own
right, instead of simply a means to induce compliance.105 In such case, using a trade
sanction multiplier may be considered unduly severe in treating what may be a positive
development.
On the other hand, the DSU prioritizes the country’s removal of its offending law
as “the first objective” outside of a mutually agreed solution and indicates that the “last
resort” of trade sanctions are “temporary and shall only be applied until such time as the
measure found to be inconsistent … has been removed,” or the member otherwise
resolves the nullification of benefits or reaches a mutually agreed solution.106 The
101

See DSU art. 22, supra note 13.
The number is determined as follows: 100 – 2((13 x 3) + 1) = 20.
103
See id. art. 22(4).
104
See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Pirate of the Caribbean? The Attractions of Suspending TRIPS
Obligations, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 313, 325-26 (2008).
105
See id.
106
See DSU arts. 3(7), 22(8), supra note 13.
102

21

18 J. Intell. Prop. L. (forthcoming 2011)

DRAFT

hierarchy of measures under the DSU prioritizes compliance with WTO agreements over
other possible goals, such as rebalancing. Every violation of the WTO agreements seeks
compliance with DSB recommendations, but very few disputes have involved trade
sanctions—and the putative possibility of rebalancing that may accrue. Moreover, the
WTO’s authorization of the “last resort” of trade sanctions against a violating country is
not typically haled as a positive development in the WTO, but rather, the opposite.107
c.

The good behavior credit

Conversely, credit can be included in the Complex Compliance Scorecard for
“good behavior” of a country for positive actions by a country, including: (i) promptly
correcting a past violation within the reasonable time for implementation, (ii) reaching
mutually agreed solutions in other disputes, or (iii) successfully defending itself from a
challenge by a WTO finding of no violation.
For example, if a country had corrected a violation within a reasonable time, we
might give, let’s say, 3 bonus points or good behavior credits to the Compliance Score to
help offset any ongoing violations.108 Likewise, because the DSU prefers that countries
reach mutually acceptable solutions instead of litigating WTO challenges, good credits
might be given to any respondent that reaches a mutually agreed solution following a
challenge to its law.109 In the equation below, Good Behavior Credit (G) would equal 3
times the total number of timely implementations, mutually agreed solutions, and
successful defenses the country had.
Compliance Score with Good Behavior = 100 – x (y1S + y2 + y3 + …) + G
With good behavior credit, the Complex TRIPS Compliance Scorecard would be:
TRIPS Compliance Scorecard (Complex + Good
Behavior Credit) (Jan. 2011)
Member
Compliance Score
Canada
100
China
100
EU
100
India
100
United States
59
Notice the U.S. score improves slightly from 62 to 59, receiving good credit in one
TRIPS dispute.110 (More dramatic improvement occurs in the U.S. trade disputes, as
discussed in Part III below.)
107

See Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 792, 792 n.2 (2001).
If a country had no live violations, its score would return to 100; the good behavior credit would
not be “banked,” at least not until a live violation was in play.
109
See DSU arts. 3(7), supra note 13.
110
See United States – US Patent Code, DS224, Current Status,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds224_e.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011). Although
108
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Multipliers for developed v. developing countries

Finally, another option would be to include a multiplier for developed countries,
based in part on the assumption that developed countries have greater resources to protect
and enforce intellectual property, and, therefore, should serve as a greater example for
other countries. To some extent, TRIPS already recognizes this assumption in the
transitional provisions afforded to developing and least developed countries.111 In the
formula below, D represents the multiplier for a developed country with a TRIPS
violation.
Compliance Score = 100 – x (y1 + y2 + y3 + …)D
If the multiplier were 1.5, the U.S. compliance score would be 43 instead of 62.112
Alternatively, instead of a developed country multiplier, we can include a
discount for developing countries. For example, the discount multiplier might be .5,
effectively giving a developing country twice the time a developed country has before
receiving the same compliance score. A developing country with 1 live violation for 10
years would receive a compliance score of 95 (instead of 90 for a developed country in
the same scenario).
C.

The Validity of the TRIPS Compliance Scorecard

Some may question the validity or usefulness of the scores computed under my
formula, either the simple or the complex scores. In January 2011, the U.S. scored the
worst of all WTO countries on the TRIPS Compliance Scorecard using either formula—
which runs counter to the popular perception that the U.S. is a leading nation for the
protection of IP.113 Conversely, China receives a perfect score under my formula based
on its correction of its TRIPS violations—which, again, runs counter to the popular
perception that China is the largest source of counterfeit goods and pirated works in the

the dispute is not formally reported as settled on the WTO website, a case brought the U.S. against Brazil
is. See Brazil – Measures Affecting Patent Protection, DS199, Current Status,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds199_e.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011). Both the
U.S. and Brazil agreed not to pursue the challenges against each other in the two disputes. Another good
credit perhaps may be given to the U.S. for the EU’s challenge in Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and
Amendments thereto, DS186, Current Status,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds186_e.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2011), although the
WTO does not indicate any resolution to the challenge.
111
See TRIPS Agreement arts. 65-66, supra note 5 (transitional provisions; least-developed
countries); DSU art. 24, supra note 13 (special procedures for least-developed countries).
112
The U.S. score would be determined as follows: 100 – 2(10 + 9)1.5 = 43.
113
See Opening Statement of Ambassador Miriam E. Sapiro, Deputy United States Trade
Representative, World Intellectual Property Day, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, April 26, 2010,
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/speeches/transcripts/2010/april/remarks-ambassador-sapiroworld-intellectual-p.
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world.114 The “disconnect” between the scores and popular perception over IP protection
may lead some to doubt the usefulness of the Scorecard.
My response is threefold. First, it is important to keep in mind that the Scorecard
is not a general indicator of overall IP enforcement in a country. Instead, it is a measure
of a country’s compliance with TRIPS where a violation has been adjudged by the
WTO—a circumstance that can be objectively determined with certainty. TRIPS imposes
certain minimum standards for intellectual property protection, but it does not necessarily
ensure the high level of protection or enforcement commonly expected in (Western)
media accounts of IP controversies between countries.115 Thus, the limitations of the
Scorecard may reflect the limitations of TRIPS or WTO generally. The U.S. efforts to
obtain “TRIPS-plus” protections against counterfeiting and piracy in the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Act (ACTA) and other FTAs—all outside the WTO—provide some
support for this conclusion.116
While the WTO might consider a more comprehensive scorecard for issues of
compliance outside of the DSB, developing a scorecard within the DSB for WTO
disputes is helpful—at least as a first step—for the institution. Though limited, focusing
on WTO disputes removes the possibility of disagreement or speculation over whether a
TRIPS violation has occurred. Instead of perceptions or subjective views on IP
enforcement, the Scorecard focuses on known WTO-determined violations.117 Study of
these known violations is fruitful for analyzing the effectiveness of the WTO dispute
settlement process.
An analogy might help explain why this is so. Imagine two taxpayers, Al and
Sally. People perceived Al as a tax evader, but Sally, a model tax payer and citizen.
Later, the IRS found both Al and Sally had delinquent taxes. Al quickly paid his
delinquent taxes, but Sally didn’t. Measuring compliance here is still valuable for the
IRS, notwithstanding the possibility that Al is, in fact, a more egregious tax evader than
Sally. The IRS seeks compliance with all of its judgments. Just because Sally may be
more of model citizen, that does not mean she should be given a free pass from the IRS.
Second, it is important to evaluate the merits of the Scorecard from the
perspective of the institution of the WTO. The goal of the Scorecard is not meant to
favor or embarrass any particular country, whether it be the U.S., EU, China, or another
country. WTO justice should be blind to the country before it. It would be a huge
114

See Daniel Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of Multi-National Companies in China: How a
Flawed Approach Is Making Counterfeiting Worse, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 749, 752-53 & n.9 (2010).
115
See Ruth L. Okediji, Rules of Power in an Age of Law: Process Opportunism and TRIPS Dispute
Settlement, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 51-52 (E. Kwan Choi & James C. Hartigan eds.,
2003) (discussing “wiggle room” in standards of TRIPS).
116
See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. (forthcoming 2011).
117
The U.S. may well be a million times better in protecting IP than China. But unless or until the
WTO finds a TRIPS violation, we have no way of knowing with certainty whether a country is failing to
abide by its obligations under TRIPS. Presumably, a country’s laws have been thoroughly vetted by the
WTO TRIPS Council. And one would expect that any egregious violation that survived such vetting would
soon face a challenge in the dispute settlement process.
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mistake to evaluate the idea of using a scorecard based on the particular scores of
countries at a certain time. The scores are likely to change over time, as some violations
are corrected and new disputes are brought. (For example, the U.S. score would jump
from 59 all the way to 94 out of 100 if one dispute is corrected and Good Behavior Credit
is included.) The right question to ask is whether the tabulation of a Compliance
Scorecard is helpful to the WTO’s surveillance of disputes, not whether we like the
scores of particular countries now.
Finally, to the extent the U.S., the EU, or other countries with uncorrected
violations feel any uncomfortableness with their Scorecards, that reaction would be a
compelling argument in favor of the WTO’s use of the Scorecard. If countries feel any
pressure to correct their violations because of the greater transparency provided by the
Scorecard, then it would serve the DSB’s objective in securing prompt compliance with
WTO decisions. There is a serious danger that the continued, prolonged violations that
have gone uncorrected may draw greater resentment by other WTO countries and
undermine the overall effectiveness of the WTO.118 As a representative of Japan
admonished recently, “full and prompt implementation of the DSB’s recommendations
and rulings was ‘essential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance
of a proper balance of the rights and obligations of Members.’”119
III.

Supplementing the TRIPS Scorecard with Other Measures

The proposed TRIPS Scorecard is offered as a simple way for the WTO to keep
better track of and to provide greater transparency to, if not pressure on, countries’
compliance with TRIPS in cases of violations determined by the DSB. This Part offers
several other options that can work in tandem with the TRIPS Scorecard.
A.

Scorecards for Other WTO Violations

Separate compliance scorecards can be formulated for other WTO disciplines,
such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994), the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).120 Likewise, an
aggregate scorecard—or a master scorecard—can be created for each country’s
compliance with all WTO agreements. Computing scorecards in these other areas may
provide a more complete picture of a country’s compliance record, including for
118

At a meeting of the DSB in September 2010, numerous countries expressed discontent, and near
exasperation, with the longstanding WTO violations by the U.S. See Sept. 2010 Minutes, supra note 55, at
¶¶ 5-16, 20 (Cuba, Ecuador, Brazil, China, Argentina, Nicaragua, Mexico, Chile, Dominican Republic, and
Japan voicing sharp dissatisfaction with the U.S.’s failure to correct its violations).
119
Id. ¶ 20 (quoting DSU art. 3(3), supra note 13).
120
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instrument – Results of the Uruguay Round,
33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994); Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, Dec. 15, 1993, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1A, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994); General Agreement on
Trade in Services, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1167 (1993). All of the WTO agreements are
summarized on the WTO website. See Understanding the WTO: The Agreements,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
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intellectual property laws as some of the disputes under GATT, for instance, may well
relate to IP.121
Because most of the other WTO agreements focus on trade, I will lump them all
together in one Trade Compliance Scorecard—in part for simplicity. (Of course,
individual scorecards can be made for each WTO agreement.) The simple Trade
Compliance Scorecard break downs as follows for the same countries listed on the TRIPS
Compliance Scorecard above:

Member
U.S.
EU
Canada
China
India

Trade Compliance Scorecard (Simple) (Jan. 2011)
Live violations
Years to comply
-5
9 + 8 + 5 + 5 + 4 years + counting*
-3
13 + 12 + 4 years + counting*
0
(3 years 8 mos. + 10 mos. + 8 mos., 3
fixed)
0
(1 year + 9 mos., 2 fixed)
0
(19 mos. + 5 mos., 2 fixed)

As indicated, the EU and U.S. have multiple uncorrected trade violations. The
U.S. has 5 uncorrected trade violations;122 the EU, 3.123
121

See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution
Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, ¶ 125 (Dec.
21, 2009) (GATT and GATS violations in China’s law China’s law “relating to the importation into China,
and/or distribution within China, of certain products consisting of reading materials, audiovisual products,
sound recordings, and films for theatrical release”).
122
The U.S.’s five outstanding trade violations in Jan. 2011 were in: (1) Appellate Body Report, US
— Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R (July 24,
2001) (DSB adopted (DSB adopted Aug. 23, 2001); (2) Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003) (DSB
adopted Jan. 27, 2003); (3) Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WT/DS267/AB/R, (DSB adopted March 21, 2005); (4) Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (July 4, 2005)
(DSB adopted April 20, 2005); (5) Appellate Body Report, United States—Laws, Regulations and
Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”), WT/DS294/AB/R (April 18, 2006) (DSB
adopted May 9, 2006); Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset
Reviews, WT/DS322/AB/R (Jan. 9, 2007) (DSB adopted Jan. 23, 2007); Appellate Body Report, United
States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R (April 30, 2008)
(DSB adopted May 20, 2008).
123
The EU’s three outstanding trade violations in Jan. 2011 were in: (1) Appellate Body Report, EC
– Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16,
1998) (DSB adopted Feb. 13, 1998); (2) Appellate Body Report, EC – Regime for the Importation, Sale,
and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) (DSB adopted Sept. 25, 1997); (3) Panel
Report, EC — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R,
WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) (DSB adopted Nov. 21, 2006). I did not include the EU
zeroing case as a live violation. Although the WTO website does not indicate correction, the EU reportedly
abandoned the zeroing practice. See EC – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen
from India, DS141, Current Status, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds141_e.htm (last
visited Feb. 7, 2011); see also Cho, supra note 69, at 674 (“[A]lthough the EU was one of the long-standing
users of the zeroing practice, it has boldly changed its policy direction in a way that fully conforms to the
AB's ruling since it lost the very first case in EC--Bed Linen.”).
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Several caveats should be noted. First, the WTO website may not be entirely upto-date, so my numbers may be affected by an inaccuracy in the WTO reporting. Second,
for the U.S., I have counted as just 1 violation the four disputes (DS322, DS344, DS350,
DS294) involving the U.S. “zeroing” regulations and methodology for computing
antidumping duties, and have measured the violation from the earliest of the 4
disputes.124 I have also included the U.S. Byrd Amendment dispute as a live violation for
the U.S., even though the U.S. repealed the law by the 2006 Deficit Reduction Act.125 In
Sept. 2010, the EU, Japan, and other countries complained to the DSB that the U.S. was
still continuing to issue disbursements under the Byrd Amendment, so the dispute does
not appear to be entirely resolved.126 On the other hand, for Canada, I have not included
as a live violation Canada’s violation in the Regional Aircraft dispute; although no
official resolution is reported by the WTO, the dispute with Brazil appears to have been
resolved.127
Another caveat is that some of the live violations included in the Scorecard may
be near settlement. Should some of these disputes settle, the scores may improve
significantly. The EU has negotiated possible settlements of all three of its live
violations, although the settlements were not yet permanent or completely resolved.128
124

See supra note 122. Zeroing, which is the subject of 10 WTO disputes, is a controversial method
to calculate dumping margins, meaning the difference in price a producer charges for exports of goods to
foreign markets, typically at prices below domestic prices or fair market value. Under the zeroing method,
the margin is treated as zero (0)—instead of a negative margin—when export price is actually higher than
the average domestic value. This methodology favors the importing country in its ability to impose
antidumping duties because negative margins are ignored in calculating dumping margins—making it
easier to find a positive dumping margin against an exporting country. See generally Mitsuo Matsushita,
Some International and Domestic Antidumping Issues, 5 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 249
(2010).
125
See Sept. 2010 Minutes, supra note 55, at ¶ 51.
126
See id. at ¶¶ 42-50.
127
The WTO website does not list a resolution to Canada’s longstanding dispute with Brazil over
subsidies for regional aircraft. See Canada – Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft,
DS222, Current Status, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds222_e.htm (last visited Feb.
3, 2011); see also Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, DS46, Current Status,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds46_e.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2011). Apparently,
the disagreement between Canada and Brazil over credits in the regional aircraft sector was resolved by
revisions to the OECD Arrangement and a new Sector Understanding on Civil Aircraft (2007). See
Dominic Coppens, How Much Credit for Export Credit Support Under the SCM Agreement?, 12 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 63, 75 (2009). Given the lack of clarity, I have not listed this dispute—or the earlier aircraft
disputes with Canada, DS70 and DS71—in the time for implementation category. For similar reason, I
have not included DS321 involving Canada’s trade sanctions against the EU in the Hormones dispute.
128
In EC Bananas, the WTO Annual Report indicated that, in Dec. 2009, the EU had reached a
settlement with Latin American countries and was close to one with the U.S. See WTO ANNUAL REPORT
2010, supra note 79, at 84. However, no final settlement of the dispute has been reported. See European
Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, DS27, Current Status,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds27_e.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2011); William
Schomberg, EU Backs Mandleson at WTO Talks, Despite France, NATIONAL POST, Jan. 10, 2010,
http://www.nationalpost.com/news/world/story.html?id=53577e94-0029-405f-813a-22249e365155 (“Other
issues which remain to be resolved include a decades-old row about trade in bananas….”). In EC
Hormones, the EU and U.S. reached in 2010 a temporary, 4-year agreement that might lead to a permanent
resolution. See Riccardo Pavoni, Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of Interpretation and Law-Making:
A Watershed for the “WTO-and-Competing-Regimes” Debate?, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 649, 676-77 (2010).
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Likewise, the U.S. has corrected some, but not all of its violation in one dispute.129 And
in the Subsidies on Upland Cotton (DS267) dispute, the U.S. reached a Framework for
Mutually Agreed Solution that was announced to the WTO in August 2010; although the
Framework is not itself a final resolution, it appears to be moving substantially toward
that end.130 Although one might argue that these near settlements should not be included
in the negative category in the Scorecard because they show positive developments in the
disputes, I have chosen to include them. There is no guarantee the disputes are resolved,
and it is probably better to avoid making difficult judgment calls in these disputes.
Using the complex formula,131 the Trade Compliance Scorecard would yield the
following scores:
Trade Compliance Scorecard (Complex)
(Jan. 2011)
Member
Compliance Score
China
100
India
100
Canada
100
EU
13
United States
-55
Unlike the TRIPS disputes, the trade disputes have involved the WTO’s
authorization of the penalty of trade sanctions in some instances. If we include a trade
sanction multiplier of 3 in the formula,132 the scores for the U.S. and EU worsen.
Because sanctions were authorized against the U.S. in the Byrd Amendment dispute, the
U.S. compliance score would drop from -55 to -135.133 The EU fares even worse. It has
Likewise, in EC Biotech, the EU and U.S. negotiated an agreement, although the U.S. has expressed
dissatisfaction with the EU’s implementation. See Sept. 2010 Minutes, supra note 55, at ¶ 28 (U.S.
contends “the EU had not resolved the fundamental problems in the operation of its regulatory system for
biotech products”).
129
See United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan,
DS184, Current Status, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds184_e.htm (last visited Feb.
3, 2011); Sept. 2010 Minutes, supra note 55, ¶ 19.
130
See United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, DS26, Current Status,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm (reporting Framework for a Mutually
Agreed Solution to the Cotton Dispute) (last visited Feb. 7, 2011); Framework for a Mutually Agreed
Solution to the Cotton Dispute in the World Trade Organization (WT/DS267),
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1996.
131
Compliance Score = 100 – x (y1 + y2 + y3 + …).
132

133

Compliance Score with Trade Sanctions = 100 – x (y1S + y2 + y3 + …).

See United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, DS217, DS234, Current
Status (authorization of Brazil, EU, India, Japan, Korea, Canada, Mexico suspension of concessions to U.S.
on Nov. 26, 2004, and Chile suspension on Dec. 17, 2004),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds234_e.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011). I did not use
the trade sanction multiplier for the U.S. dispute with Antigua related to gambling. Even though an
arbitrator determined that Antigua may request trade sanctions in US$21 million annually, Antigua said it
would rather pursue a mutually agreed solution. See United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, DS285, Current Status,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011);
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been subject to trade sanctions in two longstanding disputes (EC-Bananas and ECHormones), which drops the EU’s score from -13 to -137.134 Notice, given the trade
sanction multiplier, the EU score falls even below the U.S., even though the U.S. has
more violations.
Trade Compliance Scorecard (Complex + Trade Sanctions) - (Jan. 2011)
Member
Compliance Score
China
100
India
100
Canada
100
United States
-135
EU
-137
We also might add Good Behavior Credit (of, say, 3 points) for each of those
disputes in which respondents reached a mutually agreed solution before any WTO
decision, successfully received a finding of no violation at all in a WTO decision, or
corrected a violation within the reasonable time for implementation.135 In order to earn
Good Behavior Credit, the country must report either the solution or the timely
implementation to the DSB.136 With the Good Behavior Credit, the U.S.’s and EU’s
scores improve as follows:

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT U.S. COMPLIANCE IN PENDING CASES
47 (Jan. 29, 2010) (discussing how Antigua was attempting to reach a mutual agreement with U.S.).
Likewise, the Upland Cottons dispute with Brazil involved sanctions that were authorized against the U.S.,
but Brazil chose instead to agree to a Framework toward a mutually agreed settlement. See supra note 130.
134
See EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), DS26, DS48, Current
Status, (authorization of U.S. and Canada suspension of concessions to EU on July 26, 1999),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds48_e.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011); EC – Regime
for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas, DS27, Current Status (authorization of U.S.
suspension of concessions to EU on April 19, 1999, and Ecuador suspension of concessions to EU on May
18, 2000), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds27_e.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
135
Compliance Score with Trade Sanctions and Good Behavior Credit = 100 – x (y1S + y2 + y3 + …)
+ G.
136
See generally DSU art. 3(6), supra note 13, (“Mutually agreed solutions to matters formally raised
under the consultation and dispute settlement provisions … shall be notified to the DSB”). For Good
Behavior Credit, I did not count a settlement or implementation unless listed on the WTO website. If
several disputes all related to the same matter, I counted that as just one matter for the purposes of the
Scorecard, even if the country settled the dispute with several countries. I gave full credit for settlements
achieved with some, but not, all complainant countries, and for disputes in which the complainant
requested the DSB to terminate the challenge.
However, I did not give credit for disputes that were reported in consultations, but without any
further resolution. Nor did I give credit for a violator’s partial correction of the problem that still required
DSB activity after the reasonable time for implementation. Finally, my data are limited by what the WTO
website reported. Thus, to the extent the WTO website failed to indicate a settlement or implementation
that a respondent country had successfully reported to the WTO, my Scorecard did not attempt to correct
any WTO error.
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Trade Compliance Scorecard (Complex + Trade Sanctions + Good
Behavior Credit) - (Jan. 2011)
Member
Compliance Score
China
100
India
100
Canada
100
United States
-12
EU
-83
The U.S. did particularly well, receiving Good Behavior Credit for 15 timely corrections
of violations, 20 mutually agreed settlements or terminations of disputes, and 6 findings
of no violations at all in a dispute, for a total of 123 Good Behavior Credits.137 That
elevates the U.S. score almost to positive territory, at -12, up from -135. The EU
received Credit for timely correcting 7 violations, reaching mutually agreed settlements
or terminations in 10 cases, and succeeding as respondent in 1 dispute with a finding of
no violation, for 54 Good Behavior Credits and an overall score of -83, up from -137.138
B.

Tying Scores to Remedies or Penalties

Another option worth exploring would be for the WTO to tie the Compliance
Scorecard to some greater remedy or penalty against the violating country. In addition to
transparency in tracking a country’s compliance, the Scorecard might be given greater
consequence. Such action would likely require the WTO’s amendment to the DSU,
which would require the difficult task of garnering a consensus in the WTO.139 Of
course, WTO countries would have to debate whether or not to pursue such an approach.
I do not attempt here to conduct that debate. But, assuming such a proposal is considered
desirable, one possible amendment could be the triggering of a penalty based on a
country’s reaching a certain low score of (non)compliance.

137

See 2011 Data for U.S. in WTO Disputes (on file with author). In some disputes involving the
U.S. (DS206, DS296, DS335, DS343, and DS383), the WTO website indicated U.S. implementation, but
without giving the actual date of implementation. It turns out 4 of those 5 disputes were timely
implementations by the U.S., but one (DS206) was not. See id. I also included DS99 (DRAMS from
Korea) as timely implemented, even though Korea initially disputed the U.S. claim (but later did not
protest). See United States – Anti-Dumping Duty on Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS)
of One Megabit or Above from Korea, DS99, Current Status,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds99_e.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
138
See 2011 Data for EU in WTO Disputes (on file with author). I included DS290 (GIs) as timely
implemented even though Australia and the U.S. initially disputed the EU’s claim (but later did not
protest). See European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, DS290, Current Status,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds290_e.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
139
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Art. X:8, opened for
signature Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. at 1144, reprinted in 1867 U.N.T.S. 3 (1994) (“The decision to approve
amendments to the Multilateral Trade Agreement in Annex 2 shall be made by consensus and these
amendments shall take effect for all Members upon approval by the Ministerial Conference.”).
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For example, the DSU might be amended to contain a provision that denied a
country the ability to bring a WTO challenge should it go below an acceptable score.
The basic notion of this procedural penalty would rest on a theory of “unclean
hands”140—i.e., a country with too many uncorrected violations itself could not challenge
other countries in the WTO for alleged violations. The policy might be characterized as a
“don’t fix, don’t challenge” policy.
The threshold for a country to lose its ability to challenge could be made strict or
lenient. A lenient approach might set the threshold at a negative number on the
Compliance Scorecard, effectively allowing a country to lose 100 points before suffering
any penalty. For example, the “unclean hands” penalty can be tailored specifically for
each WTO agreement or discipline—which would give a country a greater cushion (of
100 points per discipline) to correct violations across disciplines. Under this approach,
the EU and U.S. would be subject to the “unclean hands” penalty in trade disputes, given
their negative scores on the Trade Compliance Scorecard when the trade sanction
multiplier and good behavior credits are used. (If the trade sanction multiplier is not
used, only the U.S. would face the penalty; the EU score is 13.) No country would yet be
disabled from bringing TRIPS challenges; the U.S., the sole country with uncorrected
TRIPS violations, still maintains a comfortable cushion at 62, despite its noncompliance
in 2 disputes. (Even more leniency would be afforded to countries if the trade disputes
were divided into different scorecards by each agreement.)
Alternatively, the “unclean hands” penalty can be based on the total score from
the sum of all violations—which might put greater pressure for repeat offenders to
correct their violation (depending on the starting perfect score for each country). For
example, under a strict approach, the WTO could give a total of 150 points for each
country in the master scorecard (aggregating compliance scores for TRIPS and all WTO
disciplines). Under this approach, the U.S. score worsens. It has the most uncorrected
violations (7) and would receive the worst overall score: -200 under the basic formula, 312 under the formula with trade sanction multiplier, and -186 under the formula with
trade sanction multiplier plus good behavior credit.

140

See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“a
court will not address a wrong when he who invokes its aid has unclean hands”); U.S. Gypsum Co. v.
National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957) (Patent misuse doctrine is extension of unclean hands
doctrine under which “courts will not aid a patent owner who has misused his patents to recover any of
their emoluments accruing during the period of misuse or thereafter until the effects of such misuse have
been dissipated, or ‘purged[.]’”).
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Master WTO Compliance Scorecard (Simple) (Jan. 2011)
Member
Live violations
Years to comply
United States
-7
10 + 9 + 9 + 8 + 5 + 5 + 4 years +
counting
EU
-3
12 + 13 + 4 years + counting
Canada
0
(3 years 8 mos. + 10 mos. + 9 mos. + 8
mos. + 6 mos., 5 fixed)
China
0
(1 year + 9 mos., 2 fixed)
India
0
(19 mos. + 15 mos. + 5 mos., 3 fixed)
Master WTO Compliance Scorecard (Complex) (Jan. 2011)
Member
Compliance Score
China
150
India
150
Canada
150
EU
63
United States
-200
Master WTO Compliance Scorecard (Complex + Trade Sanctions) (Jan. 2011)
Member
Compliance Score
China
150
India
150
Canada
150
EU
-87
United States
-312
Master WTO Compliance Scorecard
(Complex + Trade Sanctions + Good Behavior Credit) (Jan. 2011)
Member
Compliance Score
China
150
India
150
Canada
150
EU
-36
United States
-189
Although the U.S. and EU numbers are low, the numbers improve with
resolutions in only a few disputes. For example, the U.S. scores improve considerably if
the Byrd Amendment dispute (the U.S. maintains the violation is fixed) and the Upland
Cotton dispute (the U.S. reached a Framework toward a mutually agreed settlement with
Brazil) are deemed to be resolved. Excluding these two disputes, which seem close to
final resolution, the U.S. scores improve dramatically: -35 under both the basic formula
and the formula with trade sanction multiplier for the WTO Compliance Scorecard, and a
positive overall score of 88 (out of 150) if Good Behavior Credit is also factored in. The
dramatic improvement in U.S. score—by its resolution of only two disputes—shows how
the Scorecard affords a fair amount of leniency for countries to correct violations, even
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with multiple violations, especially if the country in question earns Good Behavior
Credit. The U.S. still would maintain a positive overall score, despite having 5
continuing violations.
Similarly, if the EU resolves the longstanding Bananas dispute, the EU score
improves to the positive territory on all cards: 118 under the basic formula, 70 under the
formula with trade sanction multiplier, and 124 if the Good Behavior Credit is included
with the trade sanction multiplier. With these few implementations, both the U.S. and
EU would be comfortably above any procedural penalty when Good Behavior Credit is
included.
IV.

Addressing Objections to the Compliance Scorecard

This Part addresses some possible objections to the Compliance Scorecard. Some
objections are general and apply to the idea of using a scorecard. Others are specific to
the proposed Scorecards above. I will address both types of objections in turn.
A.

General Objections to Using a Scorecard
1.

Shaming versus diplomacy

Critics may contend that using a compliance scorecard in the WTO runs counter
to the spirit of diplomacy and fostering of good will among WTO members. A scorecard
misapprehends the nature of the WTO dispute system. The WTO dispute system should
not be viewed as a rule-of-law system, but instead, a flexible system allowing for
negotiated concessions.141 A scorecard for members listing their uncorrected violations
on the WTO website may cause them embarrassment, if not outright shame. Some
members may feel that so-called “naming and shaming” techniques are anathema to the
WTO in that they may frustrate diplomacy.
The debate over whether the WTO is a rule-of-law or bargaining system is
unlikely to be resolved.142 Perhaps more accurately, it is a combination of both.143
Although the DSU prefers members to reach their own “mutually agreed solution,” when
bargaining fails—which it has in the noncompliance cases discussed above—the DSU
states that “the first objective of the dispute settlement system is usually to secure the
withdrawal of the measures concerned.”144 Those who assert that diplomacy or
bargaining should rule the WTO ignore this fundamental precept.
Moreover, putting aside this theoretical debate, the actual practices of the WTO
refute the diplomacy objection. As discussed above, the WTO already publicly identifies
141

See Bello, supra note 15, at 418; Okediji, supra note 115, at 52 (“disputes create a secondary
market for renegotiation of existing bargains”).
142
See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 67, at 160-61.
143
See Marco Dani, Remedying European Legal Pluralism: The FIAMM and FEDN Litigation and
the Judicial Protection of International Trade Bystanders, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 303, 321 (2010).
144
DSU art. 3(7), supra note 13.
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noncompliant members in numerous ways: (1) Panel and AB decisions, which are posted
on the WTO website, (2) dispute summaries on the WTO website, (3) the minutes of the
monthly DSB meetings, which are posted on the WTO website, and (4) the WTO Annual
Reports, which are posted on the WTO website. If diplomacy and behind-the-scenes
negotiations were all the WTO cared about, then none of this information would ever be
publicly disclosed. After all, the “naming and shaming” of the noncompliant countries
on the current WTO website should undermine diplomatic dealings by this logic, but that
has not been the case.
Implicit in the “shaming” objection is the belief that delinquent WTO countries
would care more—or feel more embarrassment—about their scores than the information
about their violations already publicly disclosed by the WTO. This is debatable.
Frankly, my fear would be the opposite—that delinquent countries would just ignore their
scorecards. After all, who cares about a scorecard when the WTO already has the power
to authorize trade sanctions against a country? In any event, a compliance scorecard,
while aggregating the data, would not contain any information that is not already publicly
disseminated by the WTO itself, other than an overall score in the case of the Complex
Scorecard. Moreover, the proposed Complex Scorecard credits mutually agreed
solutions—thus encouraging diplomatic negotiations—by awarding Good Behavior
Credit. Diplomacy and scorecards can go hand-in-hand.
To the extent that countries would be swayed by their scorecards, that prospect
strikes me as all the more reason for the WTO to use a scorecard. Because compliance
with WTO decisions is a major goal of the DSB, the WTO should consider reasonable
tools to achieve that end. The several uncorrected violations that have lasted over a
decade in the DSB appear to be showing signs of fracturing WTO members, and leading
some members openly to call into question the legitimacy of the entire WTO.145
Diplomacy can tolerate only so much delinquency before it cracks.
2.

Political feasibility of scorecard in the WTO

Perhaps the biggest objection to using a compliance scorecard in the WTO is
political: irrespective of the merits and benefits of a scorecard, the WTO would never
reach a consensus to adopt it. Especially those countries that have outstanding violations
can be expected to vote against it.
My response is threefold. First, some version of a compliance scorecard, such as
the proposed Simple Scorecard, would not need any further action or amendment by the
WTO. The WTO Secretariat already provides summaries of all disputes on the WTO
website, and the Director-General of the WTO provides summaries of all outstanding
disputes, including violations, in his Annual Report.146 If critics contend that a simple
scorecard merely listing the number of violations for a country is outside the authority of
the WTO Secretariat or Director-General, then so too would be major parts of the current
WTO website and Annual Reports. Objectors would be hard pressed to argue that the
145
146

See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
See supra note 79.

34

18 J. Intell. Prop. L. (forthcoming 2011)

DRAFT

WTO website should be shut down. The Simple Scorecard merely provides the same
information the Secretariat already provides, albeit in a different format.
Alternatively, the Trade Policy Review Board (TPRB) in the WTO might assume
the responsibility of keeping a compliance scorecard as a part of its periodic trade policy
reviews of WTO countries. Such a record-keeping procedure is consistent with the
TPRB’s overall objective “to contribute to improved adherence by all Members to rules,
disciplines and commitments made under the Multilateral Trade Agreements and, where
applicable, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements, and hence to the smoother functioning of
the multilateral trading system, by achieving greater transparency in, and understanding
of, the trade policies and practices of Members.”147 As a part of the Trade Policy Review
of each country, TPRB could include a compliance scorecard in the report.
Second, to the extent that WTO members believe that the proposed Complex
Scorecard should be considered and approved by consensus, then the WTO should
consider that route. Granted, the prospect of garnering a consensus may seem doubtful, if
not nil. But the current situation—increasing questions by members about the DSB’s
legitimacy in allowing decades-long violations to go uncorrected—may not be
sustainable in the long run for the WTO as an institution. At some point, persistent,
uncorrected violations may kill the WTO—or, at least, cripple its effectiveness.
Third, should the WTO fail to implement a compliance scorecard, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or other entities—such as Global Trade Alert,
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICSTD), Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), or even WIPO–can easily undertake
such a task. Scholars and researchers in the international IP community might volunteer
their time and assistance for such a project. Having compiled the Scorecards herein with
only 2 assistants, I do not believe the project would require significant labor, especially
after the first scorecards are tabulated. Although a scorecard not from the WTO might
carry less weight among WTO members, it would still provide the public with greater
transparency of the WTO than currently exists.
B.

Specific Objections to Proposed Scorecards
1.

Bias against big trading countries and heterogeneity problem

Some may object that my Scorecards are flawed in treating big trading countries
like the U.S. or China the same as small trading countries. Big trading countries with
large economies may be expected to face many more trade challenges in the WTO than a
country that has very little trade—and, therefore, the big trading countries should be
afforded greater leeway under the Scorecards than other countries.

147

Trade Policy Review Mechanism art. A(i), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 3, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994) (emphasis added). As discussed above, the DSB also could undertake the scorecard. See supra note
82.
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Although this argument may have surface appeal, it goes against the Dispute
Settlement Understanding. There is nothing in the DSU that supports allowing big
trading companies more leeway to comply with their WTO obligations. Under the DSU,
each member is treated alike; the only exception is special treatment for least-developed
countries.148 To the extent the WTO ever factors in trading size, the greater the size of
the trading country, the more frequent the scrutiny the country receives from the WTO in
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.149
Moreover, the fact that a country has extensive trade cuts both ways. Presumably,
such countries have greater resources than small trading countries to deal with WTO
disputes and compliance. Also, larger trading countries probably could get away with a
lot more questionable trade practices, absent the WTO apparatus. Also, big trading
countries that do face more WTO challenges have greater opportunities to earn Good
Behavior Credits under the Complex Scorecard. As long as countries comply with WTO
decisions, their scores would not be adversely affected by the sheer number of trade
disputes they face.
A related objection is that my Scorecards treat not only all countries the same, but
also all violations and all WTO agreements the same. No attempt is made to determine
whether a violation is major or minor. All violations of the various WTO treaties are
lumped together in the master Scorecard (although the individual Scorecards do provide
narrower distinctions), one might object. This heterogeneity objection is a red-herring.
The DSU itself treats the disputes all under the same dispute settlement approach and
even allows cross retaliation across disciplines.150 In the WTO, IP is treated as another
trade issue. In other words, the different disciplines of the WTO are all placed under the
same metric in the DSU. More generally, establishing a ranking system of heterogeneous
parts is perfectly feasible as long as the ranking system does not attempt to test too many
different dimensions.151 In the case of the proposed Scorecards, only a few variables are
measured, and they all center around one thing: compliance with WTO decisions.
2.

Gaming the scorecard

One final worry is that the Complex Scorecard may lead some members to try to
game the system. For example, some countries may attempt to inflate their Complex
Scorecard by inviting meritless challenges in order to earn Good Behavior Credits, or
bring more challenges against another member to lower its score. In short, countries
would play games with their compliance scores.
Avoiding some gaming of the system is probably impossible. But I find unlikely
the possibility that many countries will do so. Perhaps a few would. But there is always
148

See DSU art. 24, supra note 13.
See The Trade Policy Review Mechanism, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tprm_e.htm
(four largest trading countries reviewed every 2 years, while next 16 largest reviewed every 4 years and
other countries every 6 years).
150
See DSU art. 3(7), supra note 13.
151
See Malcolm Gladwell, The Order of Things: What College Rankings Really Tell Us, THE NEW
YORKER, Feb. 14 & 21, 2011, at 69.
149
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risk for a country to lose when bringing a sham dispute. Even if the sham is successful, a
country could face great public embarrassment both domestically and internationally if
the sham was later revealed. For example, a political leader could lose re-election if
voters found out his trade representative spent hundreds of thousands of taxpayer dollars
in order to conduct a sham WTO dispute. In any event, the formula for the Scorecard can
be adjusted to discourage sham disputes (e.g., removing Good Behavior Credits as a
variable, or otherwise penalizing the score of any country found to be engaging in sham
WTO disputes).
Conclusion
The WTO can benefit from greater transparency in countries’ (non)compliance
with WTO decisions administered by the Dispute Settlement Body. The current WTO
website provides a wealth of data, but often in ways that are not easy to obtain an overall
assessment of country compliance or the status of all ongoing disputes with adjudicated
violations. To correct this design defect in the WTO website, this Article proposes the
tabulation of a Compliance Scorecard for TRIPS and its other disciplines. This
Scorecard, to be posted on the WTO website, would provide greater awareness of and
transparency to the WTO decisions and member compliance.
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